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Abstract 
 
 
Despite many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still face 
problems in explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Institutional 
economics and the deep determinants of growth literature try to depart from pure economic 
facts to examine economic development. Therefore, this article analyzes the impact of 
institutions, geography, and integration on per capita income. Concerning theoretical 
reasoning, emphasis is on the emergence of institutions and their effect on economic growth. 
However, institutions can appear in different shapes since political, legal, and economic 
restrictions are not the only constraints on human behaviour. Norms and values also limit 
possible actions. Therefore, a differentiation between formal and informal institutions is 
made. Informal institutions are defined as beliefs, attitudes, moral, conventions, and codes of 
conduct. 
Property rights are assumed to be the basic formal institutional feature for economic success. 
Despite their direct impact on growth through individual utility maximization, property rights 
also make a statement concerning the political and legal environment of a country. 
Regarding the regression analysis, different religious affiliations are used as instrumental 
variables for formal and informal institutions.  
The regression results affirm a crucial role of informal and formal institutions concerning 
economic development. However, a high proportion of Protestant citizens encourage informal 
institutions that support economic growth, while a high Muslim proportion of the population 
is negatively correlated with growth-supporting formal institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still face 
problems in explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Economic 
growth cannot be solely determined by the conventional factors of production like physical 
and human capital accumulation and technological progress. However, breaking down the 
unknown process of productivity, growth theory has no other choice than to open up to deeper 
determinants of growth which might originate in other disciplines. This is what institutional 
economics does. Although the starting point of all actions remains familiar since human 
interactions are driven by scarcities, incentives and the desire to decrease uncertainty and 
transaction costs, further explanations shift away from pure economics and open up an 
interdisciplinary approach. Political, legal, and historical sciences, geography, trade and even 
culture and psychology are considered.1 This approach makes sense as the process of 
economic development started with the emergence of mankind and since then has been a 
mixture of all factors influencing human actions. Hence, the deep determinants of growth, that 
is the factors that determine factor accumulation and technological process, must be 
considered (Rodrik, 2003, p.4ff.; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004). However, in this 
article, the emergence of institutions and their impact on economic outcome are emphasized. 
Most of the work on institutions deals with political, judicial, and economic and thus, formal 
institutions. Often the protection of property rights is assumed to be the basic institutional 
feature for economic success. Therefore, the analysis reverts to a property rights measure 
concerning formal institutions. Additionally, culture is emphasized as a crucial determinant of 
economic growth. If culture is defined as the values, norms, conventions, codes of conduct, 
traditions, attitudes, and beliefs of a society, then culture can be equated with the term 
‘informal institutions’. Since informal institutions incorporate beliefs as well as the behaviour 
that implements these beliefs, religion is closely related to it. Hence, religion is the basis that 
delivers the beliefs which are then converted into behaviour and codes of conduct, and thus 
influences the economic activities of the individual. By this means, religious beliefs were 
transformed into cultural traits, which people nowadays may no longer connect to religion. 
   
1
 Literature:  Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson, 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005; Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Dollar  & Kraay, 2002; 
Easterly & Levine, 2003; Fernández & Fogli, 2007; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1998; 
Glaeser et al., 2004; Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2006; Hall & Jones, 1999; Knowles & Weatherston, 2006; La 
Porta et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2004; Persson & Tabellini, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2007; Persson & 
Tabellini, 2008a; Persson & Tabellini, 2008b; Porta & Scazzieri, 1997; Przeworski, 2004b; Rodrik, Subramanian 
& Trebbi, 2004; Rodrik, 2003; Sachs, 2003; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Tabellini, 2005; Tabellini, 2007; Tabellini, 
2008. 
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However, if religion shapes cultural traits, its implementation in human attitudes and 
behaviour may also affect formal institutions. Political and legal structures may be the 
outcome of historical accidents, but aside from that they depend on particular beliefs and 
attitudes and the consequent worldviews and ideologies of the society. For this reason, a 
connection between formal institutions and religious traits is established.  
 
Religion has been measured via religious affiliation indicators by La Porta et al. (1999). At 
any rate, because of data limitation, the analysis mainly concentrates on the impact of 
Protestantism and Islam. 
 
Concerning informal institutions, an indicator based on the World Values Survey is used as a 
proxy variable.2 
 
The theoretical argument demonstrates the transmission channels between institutions and per 
capita income and emphasizes the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. Moreover, a 
regression analysis incorporating informal and formal institutions, geography, and trade is 
run. Because of the endogeneity issue, different religious affiliations are used as instrumental 
variables for institutions. The regression results affirm a crucial role of formal and informal 
institutions concerning economic development.  
 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: in the second part, formal and informal 
institutions are determined and the interrelations between institutions and per capita income 
are explained according to several examples used in the empirical analysis. The third section 
emphasizes the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality. The ambiguous transmission 
channels between formal and informal institutions and per capita income are demonstrated 
and the method of instrumental variable estimation is presented as a possible solution 
concerning the econometric analysis. The fourth section exhibits the possibility of using 
religion as an instrumental variable for institutions. Both, the methodical and the intuitive 
arguments are exposed. The fifth section deals with the measurement of institutions and the 
relevant data. In this context a literature review on approaches using the World Values Survey 
data set is given. Moreover, measures of formal institutions and instrumental variable 
approaches are illustrated. The sixth part presents the data used in the empirical analysis, 
which incorporates geography and trade variables as well as the relevant instrumental 
   
2
 World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004. 
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variables. The regression approach is depicted in the seventh section. Accordingly, the eighth 
part demonstrates the regression results. Thus, informal and formal institutions play a crucial 
role in determining per capita income. The resultant conclusions are presented in the last 
section. 
 
 
 2. Formal and informal institutions 
 
Institutions constitute the social, political, legal and economic system of a state. According to 
North (1990) “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society ... (they) are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. …they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social or economic” (p. 1). Hence, institutions are the framework 
within which social life takes place. In a world without institutions a human’s reaction to a 
particular incentive is unpredictable. No patterns exist which could help to forecast human 
behaviour. Furthermore, misconduct cannot be sanctioned since a difference between “good” 
and “bad” behaviour is not defined.  This world is characterized by uncertainty and therefore 
high transaction costs. Either inhibit efficient economic activity. Therefore, people strive after 
a situation in which others’ reactions are predictable and hence uncertainty and transaction 
costs can be reduced. To achieve their target, humans are prepared to impose constraints on 
themselves whereby codes of conduct emerge which afford reliable expectations and therefore 
reduce uncertainty. These restrictions are called institutions. They are created by human 
beings to impose binding rules on social interactions and to regulate a situation of anarchical 
conditions. Institutions specify how to behave in certain situations and hence, human actions 
become predictable. Violations are punished and offenses against the constraints imply 
particular costs. Thus, uncertainty as well as information, monitoring, and enforcement costs 
are reduced. Accordingly, we can think of institutions as a particular legal system, the 
constitution of a state or business regulations — that is, the market structure as well as the 
political system can be traced back to humans’ desire to regulate their interaction. In general, 
rules that constitute the political, legal, economic, and social environment and are formally 
written down in a rule book, be it for example a legal text or a constitution, are called formal 
institutions. On the other hand, life is not constrained solely by formal institutions. Moral, 
norms, values, conventions, traditions, and codes of conduct also influence human behaviour. 
These cultural and societal factors are called informal institutions. They are not officially 
written down and a violation must not lead to state-run, but rather public or societal 
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punishment. Usually informal institutions underlie formal institutions since they determine a 
society’s basic attitudes and beliefs. Sometimes individuals might feel constrained by 
informal institutions which relate to their conviction rather than by formal institutions. North 
(1990) reverts to a plausible example of rules in sports to describe the difference between 
formal and informal institutions. Thus, formal institutions can be compared to rules that are 
written down in a rule book, while informal institutions are “unwritten codes of conduct that 
underlie and supplement formal rules, such as not deliberately injuring a key player on the 
opposing team”. (p.4).  
 
At any rate, the decisive question is how institutions influence economic development. Much 
work has been done on the issue of formal institutions and their impact on economic growth. 
Clearly, a country’s economic development is determined by its political, legal, and economic 
system. Less is known regarding informal institutions and their effect on economic outcome. 
If societies differ concerning their cultural characteristics, aggregated behaviour will vary and 
thus affect economic outcome differently. Therefore, the following section will examine the 
transmission channels between formal and informal institutions and economic growth.  
 
Informal institutions are defined as morals, values, conventions, norms, traditions, codes of 
conduct, attitudes, and beliefs. Hence, the term informal institutions can be used as a 
substitute for culture or cultural factors. The corresponding transmission channel is the 
individual her- or himself as informal institutions affect economic development on an 
aggregated level through their influence on people’s behaviour. An early example regarding 
informal institutions and their influence on economic development is Max Weber’s popular 
thesis concerning the Protestant work ethic (Weber, 2002, originally published 1904-05). 
Weber argues that the emergence of capitalism was closely related to the belief, and hence the 
resulting behaviour, of the Protestant population. Following his argument, work was not just a 
means to an end but the purpose of life and God’s will. People believed that God’s chosen 
ones were pleased with a materially good and save life. Hence, everybody tried to achieve a 
high living standard in order to believe that she or he was a chosen one. In other societies, 
where material standards play no role regarding God’s goodwill, people lack the accordant 
incentives to work hard and to invest. Therefore, according to Weber, countries with a high 
proportion of Protestant citizens were economically more successful than others. 
Consequently, beliefs, attitudes, and codes of conduct resulting from religious affiliation 
affect the development of economies. Weber’s thesis comes close to our work, as religious 
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origins result in norms and values which people implement in everyday life. For now we will 
skip the religious dimension but we will refer to this point later. At any rate, the hypothesis 
states that particular attitudes, norms, values, and codes of conduct support factor 
accumulation and technological progress while others do not. The challenge is to measure 
informal institutions and to point out concrete features with which the impact on economic 
growth can be analyzed. Hence, we must consider which human properties can be depicted, 
and demonstrate a clear relationship to culture. That is, the accordant characteristics must 
depend on values, norms, convictions and so forth, and must differ according to that criteria. 
 
Therefore, we emphasize three commonly used informal institutional factors which will also 
play a role in the empirical analysis to describe the impact of culture on economic growth. 
These factors are trust, control over one’s own life, and the societal structure, hence limited 
vs. generalized morality (Platteau, 2000). The level of trust, self-determination and the 
societal structure all depend on prevalent cultural patterns.  
 
The role of trust in an economy has been studied for some time, especially in game theoretical 
approaches. An individual’s level of trust depends on his or her cultural and societal 
background, as well as on experiences, which again are shaped by society and culture. But 
why should a high level of trust support economic growth? As already described, transaction 
costs play a decisive role in the theory of institutions. The incentive to implement an 
institution has its origin in the desire to lower transaction costs. In high-trust societies 
information is replaced by trust. Hence, the corresponding expenses are not necessary and 
transaction costs are low. People in high-trust societies may not record every detail of an act 
of sale and spend less time and money on lawyers and the monitoring process. The business 
environment and, in general, economic transactions may be less regulated than in low-trust 
societies. However, these examples already indicate the ambiguous character of institutional 
relations since an adequate regulatory structure and legal system might also increase the level 
of trust. Thus, a clear causality between trust and the respective formal institutions does not 
exist. At any rate, it is obvious that a high level of trust decreases transaction costs while 
increasing the quantity of transactions.  
 
Another informal institutional feature which depends on the cultural environment, and hence 
on prevalent norms, values, and attitudes, is an individual’s conviction concerning control 
over one’s own life. If people are persuaded of being able to influence destiny they will try to 
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improve their situation and be proactive. If, on the other hand, people believe in 
predestination, they are not in the position to better their situation through their own initiative. 
Hence, investment in physical and human capital will in general be lower than in a society in 
which everybody works hard and invests to improve her or his life. The attitude concerning 
control over one’s own life can originate from religious beliefs and cultural background, but it 
can also be the result of the institutional environment. An authoritarian political system which 
domineers over its citizens combined with bad economic performance, and therefore low per 
capita income, probably does not entail self-confidence but resignation. Hence, again 
causality is ambiguous. At any rate, believing in predestination rather inhibits growth on an 
aggregated level. 
 
The last example for informal institutional influence on individual behaviour and thus 
economic development is the prevalent societal structure, hence generalized or limited 
morality (Platteau, 2000). Of course, this feature is correlated with the former two. Limited 
morality characterizes hierarchical societies in which high levels of trust and cooperation are 
prevalent inside groups like the family, the clan, or the tribe. Within the respective group, 
transaction costs are low and business is done. However, beyond the group mistrust is 
dominant and people have less respect for members of other families, clans, or tribes. 
Cooperation between members of different groups depends on high monitoring and 
information costs and thus transactions beyond it are rare. Hence, a hierarchical society with 
distinct familial or tribal structures is less supportive for economic growth. Modern societies 
which emphasize the individual and in which respectful codes of behaviour are applied to 
everyone, independent of familial or tribal affiliation, practice what is called generalized 
morality. This permits an increase in the quantity of cooperation and transactions, while 
lowering costs, and hence, supports growth (Greif, 1994; Platteau, 2000; Tabellini, 2005). 
Moreover, in a society where generalized morality is prevalent, the free-rider issue on public 
goods may be less dominant. As people trust and respect each other, public goods may not be 
misused. The impact of the societal structure on economic development is studied by Greif 
(1994). The author explores the different development paths of Maghribis and Genoese 
traders in the late eleventh century. According to him, wealth differences can be traced back 
to differing societal patterns. In particular, it is decisive whether the society exhibits a 
collectivist or an individualist structure. Via a One-Sided Prisoner’s Dilemma, Greif 
demonstrates that the economic success of the Genoese, compared to the Maghribis, can be 
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ascribed to their individualist societal order. Thus, differences in societal organization can be 
traced back to distinct cultural affiliations.  
 
However, these examples show that different cultural features which incorporate norms, 
conventions, values, and codes of conduct influence peoples’ attitudes regarding their lifestyle 
and behaviour. Trust, control over one’s own life and the societal structure were chosen as 
examples since it is unquestioned that these characteristics do influence economic behaviour.  
 
 
Regarding formal institutions, the protection of property rights is usually described as the 
decisive institutional feature concerning growth. The exclusiveness and the irreproachable 
allocation of ownership offer the crucial incentive to invest that emanates from property 
rights. According to De Soto (2000), property rights highlight the economic potential of an 
asset and, even more importantly, assets can be used as collateral. Hence, property can 
generate new capital and receive credit. However, property rights, coupled with an 
appropriate law to protect them are, according to De Soto, the lifeline of economic success in 
Western Economies.  
 
Despite the direct channel on income, the dominance of secure property rights also makes a 
statement concerning the political and legal environment of a state. Property rights are usually 
not afforded in dictatorships or authoritarian states, where expropriation by the political power 
or even by private interest groups is possible since no appropriate law and no independent 
judiciary exist. Hence, unsecure property rights are accompanied by less political and 
economic freedom, fewer civil rights and a manipulable judiciary. At any rate, to maximize 
macroeconomic profits the opposite situation is necessary.  
 
Therefore, economic success depends on secure property rights. But who decides on the 
protection of ownership, and thus, the structure of the legal and economic system? Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005) have developed a theoretical approach which ascribes the 
emergence of the political, legal, and economic institutional environment to resource 
endowment and therefore to property rights. In their model, political power is crucial 
regarding the formal institutional environment of a state — that is, the elites in power will 
arrange formal institutions in a way that best fits their interests. The essential theoretical 
feature is the differentiation between de jure and de facto political power. Hence, legitimate 
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governance can, but must not necessarily possess de facto political power. Instead, de facto 
political power depends on resource endowment. Thus, an interest group with an adequate 
endowment of capital and other resources might be able to determine formal institutional 
properties. The exercise of de facto political power can vary. One possibility is a military 
coup in which individuals equipped with arms, money, and eventually supported by further 
interest groups, use their resources to overthrow the current government. Then the de facto 
political power will implement formal institutions which fit its interests, that is, the retention 
of political power. Therefore, civil property rights and political participation will not be 
afforded, since this would endow individuals with resources that could be used to overthrow 
the rebels.  
 
A less martial example is lobbying. Even in democratic states, particular industries or other 
interest groups use their power resulting from resource endowment to determine the 
institutional form in a way that best fits their interests, that is, the further accumulation of 
resources.  
 
Besides property rights, Rodrik (2007) emphasizes political participation as a decisive 
institution for economic growth. Accordingly, a participatory political system guarantees less 
volatile growth rates, better adjustment regarding external shocks, and less distributive 
inequality.  
 
The allocation of secure property rights is usually accompanied by political participation and 
postulates an independent judiciary. The legal system must be able to enforce property rights 
against governmental and private offences. Democracy ensures that formal institutions cannot 
be changed on behalf of a certain interest group which possesses the appropriate resources. 
Property rights in conjunction with civil liberties guarantee the efficient use of every asset in a 
state, and therefore maximal per capita income. Nevertheless property rights can also exist 
and be protected in other political systems, but since their application will probably be 
constrained in a non-democratic state, total economic efficiency will be adversely affected 
(Besley & Kudamatsu, 2008; Rodrik, 2007). Furthermore, to develop their full potential, 
ownership rights must be accompanied by a free-market system which allows every person to 
use his or her assets in a way that maximizes their individual utility. Then, the economy can 
realize its maximal growth potential on an aggregated level.    
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3. Endogeneity 
 
Empirical analysis on institutions is particularly hampered by the fact that “… institutional 
quality is as endogenous to income levels as anything can possibly be” (Rodrik, 2007, p.185). 
Since the economically relevant question is whether and how institutions influence per capita 
income, the target is to model and to measure the effect of institutions on income and not vice 
versa. Even if we wanted to estimate the influence of per capita income on institutional 
development, we should be able to single out the unidirectional effect, since otherwise the 
according coefficient would measure the bilateral impact.  
 
However, the transmission channel between informal institutions and economic development 
has already been described. Particular norms and values lead to behavioural patterns that do 
not necessarily support growth. Take for example the exclusion of women, and hence, a large 
part of the potential work force, from education and economic life in several societies. On the 
other hand, it is conceivable that income levels also influence cultural features. In general, 
institutions are characterized by their stickiness.3 At any rate, as institutions are man-made 
entities, they can be changed, although institutional alteration takes time, especially if 
informal institutions are involved. As usually only marginal progress is made from one 
generation to the next, a change in norms, values, and conventions can take decades or 
centuries (Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008; Roland, 2005).  
 
Institutions emerge in order to reduce uncertainty and to ensure stability. However, informal 
institutions guarantee a kind of non-material or social stability, while formal institutions 
secure material stability. As the standard of living increases, perspectives are modified — that 
is, under the premise of material stability, the significance of non-material stability changes. 
Therefore, morals, norms, and values are altered when perspectives and priorities change. 
Higher material security also modifies the incentives for social affiliation, and hence, informal 
institutions adjust to new living circumstances. But, since humans are social beings, the non-
material stability warranted through informal institutions cannot be replaced by material 
stability. Therefore, several norms and values are maintained, even if they seem useless from 
   
3
 Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008) define institutional stickiness as “… the ability or inability of new 
institutional arrangements to take hold were they are transplanted …” (p.332). We use the term ‘stickiness’ to 
characterize the slow convertibility of institutions in general. However, institutions must not change slowly. 
Therefore, Roland (2005) differentiates between fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. 
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an economic point of view. Individuals need these norms and values for self-identification 
and self-orientation, although they might not make economic sense.  
 
At any rate, altering informal institutions takes time and may even not be possible in respect 
to particular norms and values. Nevertheless, some informal institutions adjust to living 
circumstances. Higher material standards, for example, change the content and perspective of 
life. Social patterns that subconsciously exist for security reasons and for the reduction of 
transaction costs are no longer necessary when income increases. Therefore, the societal 
structure of generalized mortality can rather be observed in developed or rich societies.   
 
Concerning control over one’s own life, a higher living standard contributes to an attitude of 
self-determination and self-confidence. People endued with property would rather maintain 
that their wealth can be traced back to their own decisions and activities. These individuals 
will also believe that they can shape their future according to their own wishes. Of course, 
wealth can also be traced back to destiny, as, for example, in Weber’s thesis on the Protestant 
work ethic. In this thesis, people thought God’s chosen ones could be recognized by their 
material standards, and thus people worked hard and accumulated capital to show to 
themselves and others that they belonged to the chosen ones.  
 
At any rate, a high living standard will be preferred to be traced back to one’s own efforts, 
and hence will encourage further endeavour. Even in Weber’s argument, people worked hard 
and invested to show that they are chosen ones, and hence their wealth could be traced back to 
their own efforts, while they believed it was God’s will. 
 
Regarding trust, the influence of income levels may not be that obvious. We are trustful when 
we do not expect other people to cheat on us, and thus, the expectations regarding other 
peoples’ behaviour are decisive. Peoples’ actions depend on their attitudes, codes of conduct, 
conventions, and so forth, and thus, on informal institutions. This is a crucial point since 
behaviour must not be related to logical or rational patterns if informal institutions are 
involved. An alteration in expectations concerning others’ actions includes a change in 
expected transaction costs and in the general level of uncertainty. Higher income levels 
increase the living standard and material stability. Hence, even if an individual looses a part of 
its property, it still must not fear for its existence. Therefore, uncertainty and transaction costs 
are reduced. However, trust depends on common norms and values and if these will be 
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changed due to higher per capita incomes the level of trust will adjust. At any rate, the societal 
structure is crucial, since a change from limited to generalized morality will increase the 
average level of trust. 
 
Again, these are only examples for the influence of per capita income on informal institutions. 
Of course, several other cultural features can be affected by a change in living standards. A 
higher income may also be correlated with higher education standards, and therefore with 
more open-minded and educated individuals. These people may have the ability to question 
and criticize the predominant institutions, both formal and informal, and alter them. 
Therefore, in general, some level of physical and human capital is necessary to be able to 
understand the importance of a growth-promoting institutional framework. 
 
Figures 1 to 5, which can be found in the appendix, demonstrate the correlations between our 
informal institutional measures and per capita income.4 However, seemingly growth-
supportive attitudes are correlated with high income levels, while growth-inhibiting features 
come along with low income levels. Hence, the graphs demonstrate a clear relationship 
between informal institutions and per capita income. Still no statement concerning causality 
can be made.   
 
An increase in per capita income may alter not only informal, but also formal institutions. 
Figure 6 in the appendix depicts the relationship between per capita income and a measure for 
formal institutions, xconst, which will be commented later. A high level of xconst 
characterizes growth-supporting formal institutions, while a low level refers to growth-
inhibiting formal institutions. In general, low per capita incomes are accompanied by growth-
inhibiting formal institutions and vice versa. However, some distracting observations with 
high per capita incomes and low institutional values can be observed. These countries are, for 
example, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar, which exhibit relatively high per capita 
incomes, but underperform in respect to their levels of formal institutions. Indeed, these states 
are characterized by features that distinguish them from other countries with growth-
   
4
 The measures are taken form the World Values Survey and are called trust, control, respect, and obedience. 
Trust measures the level of trust within a society, control indicates how far people are persuaded of being in 
control over their lives, respect and obedience specify the hierarchical structure of the society, in which high 
levels of trust, control, and respect are supportive to growth, while a high level of obedience is growth-
inhibiting. Inform4 is a general measure of informal institutions and is created by adding up the values of trust, 
control and respect and by subtracting obedience. The subsequent chapter on the data used in the empirical 
analysis gives a detailed description of the informal institutional measures and the indicator inform4. In general, 
a high level of inform4 indicates growth-supporting informal institutions, while low levels indicate growth-
inhibiting informal institutions. 
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supporting formal institutions. The mentioned Gulf States, for example, can afford a relatively 
high living standard for their indigenous population due to their oil wealth, and therefore, they 
are able to afford “bad” institutions.5 Thus, the positions of these outliers can be traced back 
to their resource wealth.  
 
At any rate, aside from outliers with resource wealth, does a higher per capita income lead to 
formal institutions that support growth? We have already discussed this matter with reference 
to the model of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). Higher per capita incomes can shift 
the power allocation within a state. A group or person endued with appropriate resources is 
able to take over de facto political power, and therefore arrange institutions in a way that best 
fits their respective interests. If parts of the population gain de facto political power through 
economic growth and hence higher per capita incomes, they will try to enforce their interests. 
However, radical changes in political and economic institutions are difficult to explain 
without the introduction of informal institutions. An increase in per capita income alters 
informal institutions which then impact formal institutions. The basic settings of a society can 
jointly be responsible for the general concept of the state, the political system, and the 
structure of power. An autocratic government and a hierarchic system which represses parts 
of the population may enhance explicit cultural features like disrespect, mistrust, resignation, 
a collective social structure and hence, limited morality. In turn, these cultural characteristics 
again support the preservation of an authoritarian government and, in general, of the prevalent 
formal institutional structure. An increasing per capita income improves the level of informal 
institutions in the sense that people become more trustful and respectful, self-reliant, and 
confident. Apart from that, it could be correlated to higher educational standards, and 
therefore to more open-minded and educated individuals. Due to their higher per capita 
incomes, the individuals are able to enforce institutions that fit their interests. Hence, they will 
question the current system and further enforce property rights and political participation. A 
democratic state may support growth-supporting informal institutions. Independent citizens 
who can freely participate in political, economic, and social processes may realize a higher 
level of trust, self-determination, and self-confidence.   
 
The endogeneity and causality issues in institutional analysis depict a particular challenge for 
empirical work. Typically, an OLS-regression cannot be run because of a possible omitted 
variable bias and reverse causality. Institutions as they are defined in this article can be 
   
5
 The term “bad” institutions does not judge an institution on a qualitative level, it refers solely to institutions 
which are not supportive of economic growth. 
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influenced by several factors, but we are not able to detect every determinant that might have 
an effect on institutional quality. Hence, it is unavoidable that certain variables correlated with 
institutions are incorporated in the error term. That is, our coefficients are biased because of 
omitted variables. On the other hand, the aim of our work is to estimate the effect of 
institutions on per capita income. As stated above, this effect is not unidirectional. Formal and 
informal institutions influence each other and income, which again has an impact on both 
kinds of institutions. Hence, our institutional coefficient of an OLS-regression would not only 
estimate the unidirectional effect of, for example, informal institutions on income, but also the 
feedback reaction from income to informal institutions. 
 
However the problem of endogeneity in growth empirics is commonly solved through 
instrumental variable estimation — that is, we must find an instrumental variable for each of 
our endogenous regressors. The detection of an adequate instrument can become quite tricky. 
An instrumental variable must possess two features: it has to be correlated with the 
appropriate endogenous variable, and it must be uncorrelated with the disturbance. While the 
former can be tested, the fulfilment of the second feature, and therefore the relevance and 
accuracy of the regression result, relies on the researchers’ intuition. As causality is the main 
issue in our deep determinants analysis, we must determine a channel that transmits the effect 
of the particular endogenous variable in the right direction, and thus, from institutions to 
income and not vice versa. It must be ensured that the instrumental variable does not 
influence the dependent variable directly, but only through its effect on the endogenous 
variable. If this requirement is fulfilled, the causality issue is solved and the estimated 
coefficient measures the effect of institutions on income.     
 
 
4. Religion as instrumental variable for institutions 
 
According to the previous paragraph, we need instrumental variables for formal and informal 
institutions to run a regression analysis which examines the effect of institutions on income. 
Hence, we need variables that are correlated with institutions but have no direct effect on per 
capita income. Since institutions determine income, we must find out which factors determine 
institutions. Therefore, we must identify the origin of institutions and clarify whether it is 
correlated with income. If this is not the case, we can model the transmission channel from 
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institutional origin to institutions, and from there to income via a Two-Stage-Least-Squares 
estimation. 6 
 
Informal institutions are defined as values and norms. How do values and norms emerge? The 
origin of most of our values and norms can be traced back to religion, and therefore depends 
on which religion has been, and still is, dominant in a particular region. Why for example do 
we speak of the Christian West or the Islamic countries? Hence, why do we use religious 
terms to describe a group of countries or a region? The differences between these countries 
must exist in obvious areas like the social, cultural, or political life since it must affect us in 
some manner, otherwise we would not care about it. Moreover, the difference must be traced 
back to religion, since in other respects we would not use religious terms to describe the 
countries. Thus, religion seems to matter, and it matters so much that we classify countries 
according to their religious affiliations. In speaking of Christian or Islamic or Buddhist 
countries, for example, we explicitly want to highlight their religious affiliations. Hence, we 
associate the prevalent religion with obvious features that differ between the countries. This 
can constitute particular conventions, values, moral, attitudes, behaviour, or societal, political, 
legal, and economic differences. Thus, we are talking about different institutions.  
 
Therefore, we assume that the religious environment affects institutions, which then influence 
per capita income. Religion cannot directly be correlated with income if we want to use it as 
an instrumental variable. However, just being religious does not affect economic outcome. 
Religion can not achieve anything as long as it is not implemented in peoples’ attitudes and 
behaviour and at least in social, hierarchical and political structures. Only then is an indirect 
influence on income possible. Over decades and centuries, religious codes have become a part 
of the prevalent culture. Although individuals acting according to particular cultural norms 
and values may not connect these features to religion anymore, tracing the cultural properties 
back to their origin shows that religion is the starting point.    
 
Again, incentives play a role. Humans implement religious guidelines because they act from 
conviction, they fear punishment, or both, and hence, their behaviour corresponds to religious 
morality. Of course, this incorporates their economic behaviour, and thus, being religious 
   
6
 From a methodological point of view, the instrumental variable must provide a convenient source of exogenous 
variation and must not be intuitively correlated with institutions (Rodrik, 2007, p.185ff.). At any rate, the aim of 
this article is to find out whether institutional quality can be traced back to religious matters. Hence, in this case 
the potential correlation between institutions and Protestantism and institutions and Islam is of particular interest. 
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does not influence economic growth. Religious beliefs do not influence economic 
development until they become converted into norms, values, and codes of conduct. Thus, just 
being Protestant does not affect economic development, as Protestantism must operate 
through its effect on human behaviour, that is, through informal institutions.7 
 
However, the fact that formal and informal institutions are closely related to each other has 
led to the consideration that both kinds of institutions can be traced back to the same 
instrumental variable approach. Certain religious beliefs may encourage property rights, and 
therefore constraints on the executive, while others may inhibit it. The relation between 
religion and formal institutions can best be seen regarding theocratic states where religion 
claims terrestrial and religious power. But even in countries where state and religious power 
are separated, a basic attitude arising out of the religious background is prevalent. Originally 
religious beliefs constituted worldviews and ideologies, that is, political ideologies, the 
general understanding of the state and the societal system per se. Even if this is not the case 
and no general political ideology is prevalent in the society, certain cultural traits originating 
in religion may support a particular political system through acquiescence and obedience.  
 
Thus, using religious affiliation as an instrumental variable for formal institutions, we must 
assume that religion does not influence per capita income directly but only through 
institutions. As already elucidated, this is the case. Religion can not achieve anything as long 
as it is not implemented in peoples’ attitudes and behaviour and at least in social, hierarchical 
and political structures. 
 
Figure 7 in the appendix depicts the relationship between religious affiliation of the 
population and informal institutions. A high Protestant proportion of the population is 
accompanied by high levels of inform4, that is, growth-supporting informal institutions. On 
the other hand, countries with a high proportion of Muslim citizens realize a minor level of 
inform4, and hence have growth-inhibiting informal institutions. However, figure 8 
   
7
 Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2003) also have examined the effect of religious affiliation on cultural traits. Via 
the World Values Survey data set, the authors have tried to determine the degree as well as the type of 
religiosity, and connect it to societal attitudes which are supposed to support economic growth. They at least 
have not directly connected the appropriate attitudes to per capita income. The authors have concluded that, in 
general, Christian religions are accompanied with growth-supportive attitudes, while Islam seems to be less 
conducive to societal properties that are beneficial for growth. Moreover, Barro and McCleary (2003) have 
studied the effect of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic outcome. However, they have found 
that religious beliefs in general support growth. Nevertheless, church attendance seems to be less conducive to 
the growth rate, although the authors point out that the net effect has to be considered since church attendance 
might foster beliefs which are supportive for growth. They justify their results on the consideration that certain 
religious beliefs encourage specific individual behaviour that supports growth. 
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demonstrates the relationship between religious affiliation and the Freedom House property 
rights index 2000, which is scaled from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating non-protected, and 100 
completely protected, property rights. A high Protestant proportion of the population is 
attended by a strong protection of property rights, while a high Muslim proportion of the 
population shows fewer protected property rights.8 However, we use Protestant and Muslim 
affiliation of the population as instrumental variables for informal and formal institution, 
respectively. This is the case because we are looking preferably for unequal instruments. 
Since our work is close to that of Max Weber on an argumentative level, Protestant affiliation 
is used to illustrate informal institutions, as Protestantism is said to alter norms and values in 
favour of economic growth. From a Western point of view, the differences in formal 
institutions that can be traced back to religion become particularly obvious in Islamic 
countries. Consider, for example, the political and legal systems, which often cannot be 
described as democratic or constitutional, compared to Western standards. Hence, to note 
these differences, the Muslim affiliation of the population is used to illustrate formal 
institutions. That is, Protestant affiliation is assumed to be supportive for economic growth, 
while Muslim affiliation is said to be growth-inhibiting (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2003; 
La Porta et al., 1999; Landes, 1998). More precisely, Protestantism and Islam are assumed to 
have different impacts on institutional development, and the particular institutions then 
influence the growth rate. These statements will be tested within the empirical analysis. Of 
course, other religions should be considered, too, and thus, regressions including the Catholic 
affiliation of the population were run, although the intuitional justification is less clear, as are 
the empirical results. At any rate, since several data sets had to be merged for the empirical 
analysis, not enough observations remained to run regressions with further religious affiliation 
variables. Therefore, our empirical analysis is restricted to proxies for Protestantism and Islam 
and, for the sake of completeness, Catholicism. Since it is expected that Protestantism and 
Islam, in particular, have different effects on institutions, and since both religions are 
widespread, this is not a disadvantage. However, arguing that religion has an influence on the 
development of institutions, we should be clear that we are talking about Protestantism and 
Islam, and not religion in general.   
 
 
 
 
   
8
 In figures 7 and 8, countries with a Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim proportion of the population, respectively, 
greater 50 percent are used. 
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5. Measuring institutions 
 
It is not enough just to form a theory about the influence of institutions on economic growth 
nowadays. In the past twenty years the revival of growth theory has been based upon a 
mixture of theoretical and empirical reasoning. The term “informal institutions” has been 
known since North’s work in 1990. Despite that, empirical measures of institutions were 
predicted on factors describing formal institutions, because determinants like values, norms, 
morals, attitudes, and codes of conduct cannot be easily measured. However, since the 
incorporation of societal and cultural factors into economic theory has gained more 
acceptance, a few research projects dealing with the issue have emerged. The World Values 
Survey (WVS), for example, is an often used data source for indicating and measuring 
informal institutions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007; Inglehart et al., 2004). It is based on surveys 
and is separated into different parts dealing with topics like “perceptions of life”, “politics and 
society”, “religion and moral”, inter alia.  
 
An influential work concerning culture and its influence on GDP per capita, that is based on 
the WVS data, is Tabellini (2005). The author identifies history as the decisive determinant of 
economic growth and argues that culture depicts the connection between history and current 
economic development. Hence, Tabellini has had to identify a variable which reflects culture, 
is shaped by history, and influences current economic growth. Therefore, he uses the WVS 
data set and creates a cultural indicator which has been used by several researchers since then. 
As will be seen, we also resort to Tabellini’s cultural index in this article.  
 
Knowles and Weatherston (2006) rely on the WVS data set to measure the effect of informal 
institutions on economic growth. They also refer to Tabellini (2005) and use his cultural 
indicator to examine whether institutions or geography are the predominant factor concerning 
its influence on the growth rate. 
 
Williamson (2009) examines the relationship between different formal and informal 
institutional arrangements. Her aim is to detect whether institutions are transferrable, and 
therefore whether the institutional structure of economically successful countries can be 
imposed on underdeveloped economies. She also uses a modified indicator of Tabellini’s 
cultural index, and hence the WVS data set to measure informal institutions (Williamson & 
Kerekes, 2009; Williamson, 2009).  
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Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) use the WVS data to measure the effect of culture on 
expectations and preferences and their impact on economic outcomes. They estimate, for 
example, how far trust influences the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and how 
cultural traits affect saving decisions and political preferences like redistribution.  
In an earlier work, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) have analyzed the influence of 
religion on particular cultural traits which are measured via the WVS data. 
 
Religious affiliation itself is a variable that has been applied as a proxy for informal 
institutions and culture. La Porta et al. (1999), for example, use Catholic and Muslim 
affiliation of the population to measure the effect of cultural institutions on government 
performance, as both religions are emphasized as inhibiting economic development (Landes, 
1998).  
 
Measures of formal institutions are manifold, and hence not all of them will be enumerated. A 
variable often used to measure the protection of property rights is Polity III’s, or alternatively 
Polity IV’s, “constraints on the executive” (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson 
& Robinson, 2001; Glaeser et al., 2004; Knowles & Weatherston, 2006). Furthermore, 
“average protection against expropriation risk” and survey indicators of institutional quality 
from the International Country Risk Guide or Political Risk Services, respectively, are applied 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Glaser et al., 2004; Knowles & Weatherston, 2006). 
Rodrik et al. (2004) use “government effectiveness” from Kaufmann et al. 2002, while 
Glaeser et al. (2004) trace back to an institutional quality measure which includes elements 
that capture the protection of property rights and the strength of the rule of law from 
Kaufmann et al. (2003). The resultant current version is Kaufmann et al. (2008) which 
includes government indicators from 1996-2007. La Porta et al. (1999) use ethnic 
heterogeneity as a measure of redistributive tendencies and the legal system to quantify the 
relative power of the state versus property owners. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2004) 
construct measures for judicial independence and constitutional review. Glaeser et al. (2004) 
give an overview on institutional measures in their respective data appendix. Moreover, 
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) arrange a table of relevant proxies and instrumental 
variables concerning institutions and further growth relevant determinants. 
 
Since institutions are endogenous, several proposals for instrumental-variables estimation 
exist. A popular approach is the one by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), who use 
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records of the eighteenth and nineteenth century concerning mortality rates of soldiers, 
bishops and sailors in former European colonies to create a measure of settler mortality. Then 
‘settler mortality’ is used as an instrumental variable for current institutions. Rodrik, 
Subramarian and Trebi (2004), for example, also resort to ‘settler mortality’ as an instrument 
for institutions, inter alia. 
 
Other instrumental variables for institutions are, for example, the fraction of the population 
speaking English or a major European language, and the distance from the equator. Hall and 
Jones (1999) use these measures to instrument for social infrastructure which they define as 
the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within 
which individuals act (Hall & Jones, 1999, p.84). Hall and Jones justify their choice of 
instrumental variables by the fact that these variables measure the extent of Western European 
influence. 
 
Tabellini (2005) uses literacy rates in 1880 and political institutions between the seventeenth 
and nineteenth century as instrumental variables for culture. His argument is that both 
instrumental variables do not influence current economic outcome directly, but only through 
their effect on culture. Hence, European regions that were poorly educated at the end of the 
nineteenth century differ from better educated regions regarding their cultural characteristics 
even today. The same is true concerning early political institutions, which affected cultural 
patterns, and thereby current income.  
 
Knowles and Weatherston (2006) use the percentage of the population being Protestant as 
instrumental variable for informal institutions, and the proportion of the population speaking 
English and a major European language, respectively, as instruments for formal institutions.  
 
Williamson and Kerekes (2009) rely on legal origin as instrumental variable for formal 
institutions and on latitude to instrument for informal institutions.  
 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) use religion and ethnicity as instrumental variables for 
culture, since both measures are nearly time-invariant and hence the causality issue can be 
discounted. Changes in religion and ethnic background pass so slowly that the feedback from 
income on culture is not relevant. 
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At any rate, these examples show that concentrating on the so-called proximate determinants 
of growth, that is, factor accumulation and technology, can be misleading. Of course capital, 
labour, and productivity determine output. But which factors determine the levels of physical 
and human capital accumulation? As accumulation and productivity are themselves 
endogenous, they are influenced by deeper determinants, for example, informal and formal 
institutions. 
 
However, institutions are not the only deep determinant of growth. Of course, geography is a 
further determinant that affects factor accumulation and productivity. It makes a difference 
whether a country has access to the seaside and is located in a temperate climate zone, or 
whether it is embedded in inaccessible terrain and has to cope with climatic extremes like 
droughts and heat or severe rainfall and cold. Moreover, the geographical position determines 
a country’s resource endowment and is responsible for the disease environment. A further 
deep determinant is integration, or alternatively, trade or openness. As some countries are 
more accessible and easier to reach than others, integration is, of course, influenced by 
geography. Moreover, several connections between integration, institutions, and the 
proximate determinants exist, as all factors influence each other (Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004).  
 
Hence, running a regression analysis with only institutions as independent variables will result 
in biased coefficients, as other deep determinants are omitted. Therefore, geography and 
openness will also be incorporated in the following empirical work. Apart from the issue of 
omitted variable biases, the consideration of geography and trade allows further insights 
concerning their influence on per capita income. Hence, the individual impacts of all deep 
determinants can be analyzed and compared to each other.  
 
 
6. Data 
 
In my analysis, I follow Tabellini (2005) and Knowles and Weatherston (2006) with respect 
to their informal institutions index. Using data from the WVS, Tabellini composed an index 
of four cultural features. According to Tabellini: ”Three of them are expected to encourage a 
positive and productive attitude towards market exchange, entrepreneurial activities, or the 
production of public goods … The fourth indicator is symptomatic of a more hierarchical 
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society where individuals are less likely to take advantage of economic opportunities or to 
cooperate with each other …” (Tabellini, 2005, p.8f.). The measures are trust, control, 
respect, and obedience. As already illustrated, a high level of trust decreases transaction costs, 
while increasing the quantity of transactions and, accordingly, economic growth. In the WVS, 
trust is measured with the following question: ”Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Possible 
answers are “Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful”, and “Don’t know”. The 
level of trust in a country is measured by the percentage of respondents who answered that 
“Most people can be trusted”.  
 
The second measure that favours economic development is control. The corresponding 
question in the WVS is: “Some people feel that they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens 
to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ’a 
great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way 
your life turns out”. As already explained, being persuaded of having control over one’s own 
life supports growth, and thus, a high number for control is positively correlated with per 
capita income. To measure control I follow Knowles and Weatherston (2006) who used the 
percentage of respondents in a country who gave a score of 7-10 concerning the former 
question. 
 
The last growth supporting feature is respect. In the WVS, the corresponding question is: 
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.” Respondents can decide 
between “good manners, independence, obedience, hard work, feeling of responsibility, 
imagination, thrift, saving money and things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, 
unselfishness, and tolerance and respect for other people”. The variable respect is measured as 
the percentage of respondents in each country that has mentioned “tolerance and respect for 
other people”.  
 
The fourth element of Tabellini’s cultural indicator is obedience. This factor is not supportive 
to growth as it increases. The appropriate question in the WVS is again the one asking for 
important qualities in children. Hence, obedience is measured by the percentage of 
respondents answering that obedience is an important quality for children to learn. According 
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to Tabellini, obedience without further reflection is a typical feature of hierarchical societies. 
Individualism is suppressed and obedience is more important than one’s own opinion and 
personal responsibility. The suppression of individualism makes cooperation difficult and has 
negative effects on economic development (Tabellini, 2005, p.11). Therefore, respect and 
obedience are used as proxies for the societal structure, resulting in generalized vs. limited 
morality. Accordingly, a country with a high level of respect and a low level of obedience is 
expected to realize generalized morality and vice versa. 
 
Tabellini creates two indicators using the four cultural traits. He obtains the first one by 
applying first principle component analysis and the second one by adding up the three 
positive measures minus obedience. Here it was decided to follow the second approach in 
creating an indicator of informal institutions. Therefore trust, control, and respect were added 
together, and obedience was subtracted. The resulting indicator is called inform4. 
 
A proxy for formal institutions must reflect the interrelationship between formal institutions 
and growth. As already shown, property rights are usually assumed to be the main 
determinant for growth. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), for example, emphasize the 
importance of property rights institutions. According to the authors “… property rights 
institutions are intimately linked to the distributions of political power in society because they 
regulate the relationship between ordinary private citizens and the politicians or elites with 
access to political power” (p.951). Hence, their preferred measure of property rights is Polity 
IV’s “constraints on the executive”, which measures the extent of institutionalized constraints 
on the executive. Its scale ranges from “unlimited authority” (1) to “executive parity or 
subordination” (7). Following Acemoglu and Johnson, this means of measurement has two 
advantages, “… first, it corresponds to the procedural rules constraining state action, and 
second, it highlights the close relationship between property rights institutions and political 
institutions” (p.951). 
 
I follow Acemoglu’s and Johnson’s approach and use Polity IV’s “constraints on the 
executive” as a proxy for formal institutions in my regression analysis.  
 
To allow for ecological conditions and geography, I use a measure of malaria risk. The 
variable is called malfal94 and was first introduced by Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998). It 
emerged from a variable called MAL94P which depicts “… the proportion of each country’s 
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population that live with risk of malaria transmission …” (Sachs, 2003, p.5). Malfal94 “… 
multiplies the MALP94 index by an estimate of the proportion of national malaria cases that 
involve the fatal species, Plasmodium falciparum, as opposed to three largely non-fatal 
species of the malaria pathogen (P. vivax, P. malariae, and P. ovale)” (Sachs, 2003, p.5). The 
measure was also used by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002), and Knowles and Weatherston (2006).  
 
Openness is measured with data from the Penn World Tables 6.2. I use the variable openk 
which represents exports plus imports, divided by real GDP per capita in constant prices. The 
base year is 1996. 
 
The data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 is also used to measure per capita income. The 
corresponding variable is called rgdpl, which represents real GDP per capita in constant 
prices. Again, the reference year is 1996.  
 
 
7. Regression Approach 
 
The equation to be estimated is: 
 
(1)  1 2 3 4y I F GEO OPEN= α + β + β + β + β , 
 
where y indicates GDP per capita, I stands for informal and F for formal institutions, GEO 
denotes geography, and OPEN is openness.   
 
Equation (2) corresponds to (1) with only the accordant proxies being inserted: 
 
(2)  1 2 3 4log(rgdpl) inf orm4 xconst malfal94 openk= α + β + β + β + β . 
 
First of all the equation is estimated via OLS. However, as the causality between institutions 
and per capita income is mutual, endogeneity is definitely an issue in the regression, and 
therefore OLS may not be an accurate estimation method.  
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However, the 2SLS method is used to solve the problem of unclear causality between 
institutions and per capita income. Consequently the other regressors are assumed to be 
exogenous.  
 
At any rate, after instrumenting for formal and informal institutions, endogeneity could still be 
an issue in respect to geography and integration. Definitely, a higher per capita income lowers 
malaria risk. Better health care is affordable at the state, as well as at the individual, level and 
vaccine is available for major parts of the population. Being aware of this issue, Sachs (2003) 
introduced an instrumental variable called Malaria Ecology (ME) which “is built upon 
climatological and vector conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is therefore 
exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions, [therefore] ME provides 
an ideal instrumental variable for malaria risk” (Sachs, 2003, p.7). Hence, ME is used as 
instrument for malaria risk.  
 
Concerning openness, it could be argued that richer countries are prone to open their 
economies as they are not protecting infant or other indigenous industries from competition 
on the world market. Hence, openness may lead to higher incomes, but higher incomes may 
also cause more openness. As in the former malaria case, it reverts to a well-established 
instrumental variable concerning openness, and therefore the natural logarithm of the Frankel-
Romer actual trade share is used (Frankel & Romer, 1999).  
 
 
8. Regression results 
 
Since the empirical analysis consists of different data sets, the number of included countries 
varies between 72 and 54. No differentiation has been made between particular country 
groups like OECD countries, developing countries, or former colonies, since this would 
further decrease the sample size. Instead, all countries for which data are available are 
incorporated in each case. Tables 1-6 can be found in the appendix. 
 
The first column of Table 1 demonstrates the OLS regression results. A one percentage point 
increase in inform4 leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase in per capita income. The result is 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on xconst is also significant at the 1 percent 
level. Accordingly, a one-score-increase leads to a rise in per capita income of 13 percent. Of 
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course, the coefficient on malfal94 has a negative sign as an increase in malaria risk leads to a 
decline in income. Openk is significant at the 5 percent level and its coefficient is quite small, 
but at any rate a positive effect of openness on income becomes apparent.  
 
As the size of the coefficients can be misleading concerning the variables’ impact on income 
compared to each other, the first column of Table 2 presents the beta-coefficients of the OLS 
regression. When measured in standard deviations, inform4 has the largest effect on per capita 
income compared to all included variables. Therefore, informal institutions seem to play a 
decisive role in explaining per capita income patterns. 
 
Columns two and three of Table 1 show the first and second stage regression of a 2SLS 
estimation using protestant as an instrument for informal institutions. The coefficient on 
protestant in the first-stage regression demonstrates the variables’ correlation with inform4, 
which is a precondition for its use as an instrumental variable. The second-stage regression 
confirms the OLS results. The coefficient on inform4 is significant at the 1 percent level. A 
one percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 1.2 percentage point rise in per capita 
income. A one-score-increase of xconst on its scale from one to seven leads to a 12 percent 
higher per capita income. 
 
Again, the beta-coefficients in column three of Table 2 shed some light on the relation of the 
independent variables concerning their impact on per capita income. A one standard deviation 
increase in inform4 leads to an increase of 0.48 standard deviations in per capita income. The 
other variables’ beta-coefficients are smaller than that. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates further 2SLS results. In regression (4) we use protestant and muslim as 
instruments for inform4 and xconst, respectively. Protestant is highly significant in the first 
stage regression on inform4. As expected, muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and 
significant at the 1 percent level in the first-stage regression on xconst. Hence, a higher 
Protestant affiliation of the population enhances growth-supporting informal institutions, 
while a high Muslim affiliation decreases the level of growth-supporting formal institutions. 
In the second-stage regression, all variables are significant at least at the 5 percent level. A 
one percentage increase in inform4 leads to a rise in per capita income of 1.1 percentage 
points. If xconst increases at one score, per capita income rises at 17.3 percent. A look at the 
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beta coefficients of Table 4 again demonstrates the superiority of inform4, which, when rising 
at one standard deviation, leads to a 0.43 standard deviation increase in per capita income.    
 
Regression (5) demonstrates the case where we use catholic in place of muslim as an 
instrumental variable. Again, protestant is significant at the 1 percent level concerning 
inform4. Protestant and catholic are both significant in the first-stage regression on xconst. In 
the second-stage regression, inform4 becomes insignificant, while the coefficient on xconst 
increases.  
 
Regressions (6)-(8) show the 2SLS results when we use instrumental variables for all 
independent variables. The first-stage regressions for malfal94 and openk are not listed in the 
tables. At any rate, the instrumental variables me and logfrankrom are highly significant in 
each case. In regression (6) muslim is used as instrumental variable for xconst. Now, 
protestant is only significant on inform4, while muslim is significant and negatively correlated 
with xconst. All regressors of the second-stage regression are significant at least at the 10 
percent level. A one percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.86 percentage point 
increase in per capita income. If xconst rises at one score, per capita income increases at 19.2 
percent. Regarding the beta coefficients in Table 4, a one standard-deviation-increase in 
inform4 leads to a rise in per capita income by 0.36 standard deviations, which is nearly the 
same amount as the beta coefficient on xconst. 
 
In regression (7), again, catholic is used instead of muslim as an instrumental variable for 
xconst, while all independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. However, inform4 is 
significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on xconst again increases compared to 
regressions (1) and (3) in which muslim is used as instrument, though the increase is not 
excessive. The most notable alteration occurs in the beta-coefficients-table, where the 
coefficient on xconst increases from 0.36 to 0.5 standard deviations. Hence, using catholic as 
an instrument for formal institutions, xconst gains more importance regarding its effect on per 
capita income and compared to the other regressors, while inform4 becomes less significant. 
 
Regression (8) is overidentified — that is, protestant, muslim, and catholic are used as 
instrumental variables. However, when muslim is incorporated, catholic is not significant in 
the first-stage regression on xconst. Instead, muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Protestant is also significant at the 1 percent level in the 
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first-stage regression on inform4. Except for openk, all regressors are significant in the 
second-stage regression. A one percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.8 percentage 
point increase in per capita income. If xconst increases at one score, income rises at 20.6 
percent. Regarding the beta-coefficients, the coefficient on xconst decreases to 0.39 standard 
deviations, but is still higher than the coefficient on inform4 and malfal94. However, using 
protestant, muslim, and catholic as instrumental variables, the disturbing effect of catholic 
decreases. The coefficients on inform4 and xconst are comparable to the ones using only 
protestant and muslim, and thus, the overidentified regression can be used as a test of 
robustness. If catholic has a significant effect which disturbs the relationship, the result would 
not be robust in comparison to the ones using protestant and muslim. Thus, the correlation 
between protestant, muslim, xconst and inform4 is stable. At any rate, catholic does not seem 
to fit into the intuitive argument. While Protestantism and Islam seem to have an impact on 
institutions, this must not hold for all religions. 
 
To assure the results, some tests were conducted in order to shed light on a few issues 
concerning instrumental variable estimation. However, the small sample size demonstrates a 
problem regarding 2SLS estimation as well as testing. But, as we are working with country 
data and different data sets, there is nothing we can do about that issue. Therefore, the tests 
can best be seen as an additional coverage, but they are not fully reliable and have to be 
considered with caution. Most assumptions and conclusions must be considered by relying on 
intuition.  
 
A perpetual issue in empirical work is that of heteroskedasticity. Although heteroskedasticity 
does not affect the consistency of the instrumental variable coefficient estimate, it does affect 
the estimates of the standard errors. Therefore, the Pagan-Hall test was applied on regressions 
4, 5 and 6 to detect possible heteroskedasticity in the 2SLS estimations. The results suggest 
that heteroskedasticity is not existent in the accordant regressions. However, caution is 
advisable concerning this outcome as the Pagan-Hall test statistic might not be useful working 
with small sample sizes (Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 2003, p.14). Therefore, additionally, the 
White-Koenker test statistic was used, even though this test is usually not applied in 
instrumental variable estimation. However, again, the result suggests that no 
heteroskedasticity is prevalent.  
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Concerning the validity of the instruments, the Sargan test statistic was implemented, again 
only for the case of overidentification, as the test is not valid otherwise. However, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and thus, the instrumental variables are not correlated with the 
disturbance. Again, we cannot fully rely on the test statistic since the Sargan test may not be 
valid when all instruments share the same rationale (Murray, 2006, p.117). As three religious 
affiliation variables are used as instrumental variables, this definitely is the case, and thus, the 
test only affirms our regression results but cannot be seen as evidence. 
 
In the end, the Shea statistic to test for the issue of instrumental variable irrelevance was 
applied. Again, we achieved a positive result since at least the instruments for institutions are 
clearly relevant. To solve the problem of instrumental variable irrelevance, it is also useful to 
have a look at the first-stage regression results. The relevance is confirmed, since all 
instruments are highly significant in respect to the accordant endogenous regressors.  
 
Table 5 demonstrates several tests of robustness. Yet again, regressions (6)-(8) were run 
including further independent variables, respectively. However, Panel A incorporates dummy 
variables for English and French legal origin as additional regressors. The original regression 
results are robust. Again, inform4 becomes insignificant when catholic is used as sole 
instrumental variable for formal institutions. Moreover, the coefficient on malfal94 further 
decreases. Interestingly, the coefficient on English legal origin is significant at the 5 percent 
level in all regressions.  
 
Panel B includes a measure of population density (Sachs, 2003). Again, the original 
regression results are robust in respect to the inclusion of the additional regressors, while 
pop100km itself is insignificant. 
 
In panels C, D, and E, the variables coastline, temperature, and landlocked from the Parker 
(1997) data set are added as exogenous regressors. All three factors are insignificant, while 
the results remain robust. The variables in panel C, D, and E depict geography measurements. 
Since they are not significant in contrast to malfal94, panel F examines what happens when 
malfal94 is omitted, that is, when we do not control for geographical or ecological 
determinants at all. Still the results are robust. The main difference is depicted by openk, 
which is significant at the 5 percent level in all regressions, and thus, there does not seem to 
be a high correlation between malfal94 and our institutional measures. 
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The empirical analysis demonstrates that at least Protestantism and Islam have a significant 
influence on the quality of institutions. Accordingly, a high proportion of Protestant 
population accompanies growth-supporting informal institutions, while a high proportion of 
Muslim population is negatively correlated with the constraints on the executive in the 
particular countries. Furthermore, our indicator of informal institutions is positively correlated 
with per capita income. Hence, informal institutions can be growth-supportive or growth-
inhibiting. The higher the levels of trust, control, and respect, and the lower the level of 
obedience, so much the better for economic growth. Moreover, our measure of formal 
institutions and malaria risk are significant for per capita income, while openness at least 
becomes insignificant. It can be concluded that a one percentage point increase in inform4 
leads to an increase in per capita income between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points. If xconst 
increases by one unit per capita, income rises about 20 percentage points.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The article tries to incorporate cultural traits in growth analysis and examines whether the 
emergence of institutions can be traced back to religious origins. The assumption is that not 
only formal but also informal institutions, and hence cultural factors, have an impact on 
economic growth. Theoretical and empirical analysis must consider the issues of endogeneity 
and reverse causality. Therefore, the transmission channels between informal and formal 
institutions and per capita income are examined. It is argued that religion, particularly 
Protestantism and Islam, influences the development of institutions. Therefore, the emergence 
of growth-supporting or growth-inhibiting formal and informal institutions depends on the 
prevalent religious, in our case Protestant and Islamic, morality. Concerning empirical 
analysis, the usual OLS approach is not practicable. Hence, we run several 2SLS regressions 
and use the proportion of the population being, respectively, Protestant or Muslim as 
instrumental variables. Protestant and Muslim are highly correlated with the accordant 
institutional indicators. Thus, a high Protestant proportion of the population is correlated with 
growth-supporting informal institutions, while a high percentage of Muslim citizens is 
correlated with growth-inhibiting formal institutions. Moreover, the second-stage regressions 
demonstrate that cultural factors have a crucial impact on per capita income.  
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The relevance of this result stems from the particular properties of informal institutions. In 
general, institutions are characterized by their stickiness, and thus, alterations take place 
slowly. Institutions which are responsible in particular for self-identification and non-material 
stability, that is informal institutions, are even more resistant to change (Boettke, Coyne & 
Leeson, 2008; Roland, 2005). At the same time these institutions are jointly responsible for 
economic development and are ambiguously correlated with formal institutions and income. 
Hence, an alteration of formal institutions which obviously hinder growth encounters several 
problems. First, formal and informal institutions are correlated, and many formal institutions 
even originate in informal institutions. Therefore, when changing formal institutions, the 
ambiguous transmission channels and the prevalent informal institutions must be considered. 
Otherwise the change can lead to unexpected results. At the least, the modification could 
worsen the situation or simply have no effect, as the prevalent culture might not match the 
formal transformations. Second, political or economic patterns, which in general are 
considered to be supportive for economic growth, do not do the job in certain countries with 
different societal and cultural origins, and thus, some institutions cannot be exogenously 
modified — that is, the transformation of institutions is constrained. And third, no true or 
right institutional structure exists, as the quality of institutions depends on their societal 
environment. Hence, institutions that might be judged as growth-inhibiting in one country can 
be quite effective somewhere else. This holds for formal as well as informal institutions. 
 
Of course, this means that a general pattern of growth which can be applied to every country 
does not exist. Although this conclusion might be depressing because it limits the scope for 
development economics, it has important political implications in that the implementation of 
standard Western institutions might not be helpful in certain cases. Thus, in the majority of 
cases, externally imposed institutions that are not rooted in the historical and cultural 
environment will not be accepted. 
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Table 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent 
Variable is GDP 
Per Capita 2000 
2SLS Regression: 
First Stage 
Regression for 
inform4 
2SLS Regression: 
Second Stage 
Regression for 
logrgdpl 
 logrgdpl inform4 logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0109*** 
(0.00202) 
 0.0123*** 
(0.00341) 
xconst 0.130*** 
(0.0391) 
3.127 
(1.893) 
0.121*** 
(0.0439) 
malfal94 -1.228*** 
(0.283) 
-47.29*** 
(13.08) 
-1.167*** 
(0.310) 
openk 0.00306** 
(0.00121) 
0.00863 
(0.0591) 
0.00303** 
(0.00123) 
protestant  0.849*** 
(0.140) 
 
N 72 71 71 
R-sq 0.698 0.543 0.696 
adj. R-sq 0.680 0.515 0.677 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2 
Beta-Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent 
Variable is GDP 
Per Capita 2000 
2SLS Regression: 
First Stage 
Regression for 
inform4 
2SLS Regression: 
Second Stage 
Regression for 
logrgdpl 
 logrgdpl inform4 logrgdpl 
inform4 0.428*** 
(0.00202) 
 0.483*** 
(0.00341) 
xconst 0.254*** 
(0.0391) 
0.155 
(1.893) 
0.236*** 
(0.0439) 
malfal94 -0.330*** 
(0.283) 
-0.323*** 
(13.08) 
-0.314*** 
(0.310) 
openk 0.172** 
(0.00121) 
0.012 
(0.0591) 
0.170** 
(0.00123) 
protestant  0.539*** 
(0.140) 
 
N 72 71 71 
R-sq 0.698 0.543 0.696 
adj. R-sq 0.680 0.515 0.677 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3 
Second Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl Logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0109*** 
(0.00400) 
0.00574 
(0.00504) 
0.00858** 
(0.00368) 
0.00701* 
(0.00401) 
0.00799** 
(0.00364) 
xconst 0.173** 
(0.0756) 
0.372*** 
(0.115) 
0.192** 
(0.0795) 
0.264** 
(0.107) 
0.206** 
(0.0784) 
malfal94 -1.123*** 
(0.311) 
-0.952** 
(0.395) 
-1.672*** 
(0.441) 
-1.595*** 
(0.473) 
-1.654*** 
(0.443) 
openk 0.00306** 
(0.00124) 
0.00318** 
(0.00153) 
0.00357* 
(0.00207) 
0.00378* 
(0.00225) 
0.00330 
(0.00206) 
N 71 71 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.692 0.528 0.746 0.714 0.743 
adj. R-sq 0.673 0.500 0.726 0.691 0.722 
First Stage Regression for inform4 
 inform4 inform4 inform4 inform4 inform4 
protestant 0.8574*** 
(0.1345106) 
0.9494*** 
(0.136617) 
0.9469*** 
(0.166029) 
1.0744*** 
(0.1714106) 
0.8767*** 
(0.1940608) 
muslim -0.1883** 
(0.0918251) 
 -0.2240* 
(0.1226835) 
 -0.2891* 
(0.1457571) 
catholic  0.0733 
(0.0836375) 
 0.0731 
(0.1083806) 
-0.0960 
(0.1354816) 
malfal94 -53.0080*** 
(12.24383) 
-53.6000*** 
(12.56881) 
   
me   -2.8572** 
(1.105264) 
-2.9466** 
(1.153863) 
-2.9626** 
(1.120838) 
openk -0.0132 
(0.0593203) 
0.0087 
(0.0599762) 
   
logfrankrom   1.1941 
(4.919869) 
0.5148 
(5.082386) 
1.4679 
(4.960132) 
R-sq 0.5522 0.5292 0.5449 0.5127 0.5496 
adj. R-sq 0.5251 0.5007 0.5077 0.4729 0.5027 
First Stage Regression for xconst 
 xconst xconst xconst xconst Xconst 
protestant 0.0128* 
(0.006761) 
0.03098*** 
(0.0077258) 
0.0094 
(0.0076356) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0090774) 
0.0112 
(0.0089577) 
muslim -0.0316*** 
(0.0046155) 
 -0.0320*** 
(0.0051822) 
 -0.0304*** 
(0.006728) 
catholic  0.0205*** 
(0.0047298) 
 0.0201*** 
(0.0057395) 
0.0024 
(0.0062537) 
malfal94 -2.0418*** 
(0.6154218) 
-2.0514*** 
(0.7107797) 
   
me   -0.1006* 
(0.0508302) 
-0.0963 
(0.0611051) 
-0.0980* 
(0.0517371) 
openk -0.0039 
(0.0029817) 
-0.00004 
(0.0033917) 
   
logfrankrom   0.0538 
(0.2262607) 
-0.0531 
(0.2691478) 
0.0470 
(0.2289563) 
R-sq 0.5383 0.3855 0.5337 0.3380 0.5351 
adj. R-sq 0.5103 0.3482 0.4957 0.2840 0.4867 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Continuation Table 3: 
Tests 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First stage 
F-value 
(inform4) 
  14.66 12.89 11.71 
First stage 
F-value 
(xconst) 
  14.02 6.25 11.05 
Partial R-
squared 
(inform4) 
  0.5449 0.5127 0.5496 
Partial R-
squared 
(xconst) 
  0.5337 0.3380 0.5351 
Shea 
Partial R-
squared 
(inform4) 
  0.3552 0.3365 0.3670 
Shea 
Partial R-
squared 
(xconst) 
  0.3121 0.1927 0.3249 
Pagan Hall 
(p-value) 
  0.1628 0.1655 0.1287 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
    0.34858 
White Koen. 
(p-value) 
  0.0725 0.0981 0.0662 
 
 
Table 4 
Beta-Coefficients 
Second Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl Logrgdpl 
inform4 0.429*** 
(0.00400) 
0.226 
(0.00504) 
0.356** 
(0.00368) 
0.291* 
(0.00401) 
0.331** 
(0.00364) 
xconst 0.337** 
(0.0756) 
0.724*** 
(0.115) 
0.362** 
(0.0795) 
0.498** 
(0.107) 
0.388** 
(0.0784) 
malfal94 -0.302*** 
(0.311) 
-0.256** 
(0.395) 
-0.458*** 
(0.441) 
-0.436*** 
(0.473) 
-0.453*** 
(0.443) 
openk 0.172** 
 (0.00124) 
0.179** 
(0.00153) 
0.199* 
(0.00207) 
0.210* 
(0.00225) 
0.183 
(0.00206) 
N 71 71 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.692 0.528 0.746 0.714 0.743 
adj. R-sq 0.673 0.500 0.726 0.691 0.722 
adj. R-sq 0.5103 0.3482 0.4957 0.2840 0.4867 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 
Panel A 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 Logrgdpl logrgdpl Logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00936** 
(0.00463) 
0.00732 
(0.00514) 
0.00866* 
(0.00455) 
xconst 0.201** 
(0.0824) 
0.294** 
(0.112) 
0.211** 
(0.0810) 
malfal94 -2.211*** 
(0.537) 
-2.132*** 
(0.584) 
-2.152*** 
(0.529) 
openk 0.00426* 
(0.00216) 
0.00455* 
(0.00240) 
0.00397* 
(0.00213) 
english 0.655** 
(0.268) 
0.674** 
(0.294) 
0.619** 
(0.263) 
french 0.238 
(0.246) 
0.241 
(0.268) 
0.209 
(0.242) 
N 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.741 0.692 0.747 
adj. R-sq 0.708 0.653 0.715 
 
Panel B 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 Logrgdpl logrgdpl Logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00856** 
(0.00372) 
0.00710* 
(0.00403) 
0.00795** 
(0.00368) 
xconst 0.191** 
(0.0814) 
0.265** 
(0.111) 
0.206** 
(0.0803) 
malfal94 -1.668*** 
(0.454) 
-1.608*** 
(0.487) 
-1.651*** 
(0.457) 
openk 0.00353 
(0.00224) 
0.00389 
(0.00248) 
0.00327 
(0.00223) 
pop100km 0.0206 
(0.254) 
-0.0639 
(0.293) 
0.0306 
(0.255) 
N 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.747 0.713 0.744 
adj. R-sq 0.721 0.683 0.717 
 
Panel C 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 Logrgdpl logrgdpl Logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00853** 
(0.00382) 
0.00707* 
(0.00418) 
0.00805** 
(0.00381) 
xconst 0.191** 
(0.0810) 
0.264** 
(0.108) 
0.206** 
(0.0798) 
malfal94 -1.683*** 
(0.470) 
-1.587*** 
(0.504) 
-1.654*** 
(0.472) 
openk 0.00370* 
(0.00205) 
0.00369* 
(0.00218) 
0.00350* 
(0.00205) 
coastline 0.000000732 
(0.00000704) 
-0.000000544 
(0.00000759) 
0.000000566 
(0.00000708) 
N 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.747 0.714 0.744 
adj. R-sq 0.721 0.684 0.717 
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Table 5 
Panel D 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00864** 
(0.00364) 
0.00722* 
(0.00393) 
0.00811** 
(0.00360) 
xconst 0.182** 
(0.0791) 
0.247** 
(0.106) 
0.194** 
(0.0781) 
malfal94 -1.699*** 
(0.442) 
-1.627*** 
(0.471) 
-1.689*** 
(0.445) 
openk 0.00290 
(0.00202) 
0.00313 
(0.00219) 
0.00268 
(0.00202) 
landlocked 0.339 
(0.257) 
0.316 
(0.271) 
0.336 
(0.259) 
N 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.757 0.732 0.753 
adj. R-sq 0.732 0.704 0.728 
 
Panel E 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0115** 
(0.00532) 
0.0107* 
(0.00560) 
0.0104** 
(0.00513) 
Xconst 0.198** 
(0.0851) 
0.279** 
(0.121) 
0.212** 
(0.0826) 
malfal94 -1.917*** 
(0.529) 
-1.907*** 
(0.569) 
-1.865*** 
(0.520) 
openk 0.00380* 
(0.00225) 
0.00410 
(0.00251) 
0.00346 
(0.00219) 
temperature 0.0254 
(0.0241) 
0.0330 
(0.0289) 
0.0220 
(0.0236) 
N 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.715 0.669 0.721 
adj. R-sq 0.685 0.634 0.692 
 
Panel F 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00972** 
(0.00432) 
0.00735 
(0.00476) 
0.00886** 
(0.00426) 
xconst 0.203** 
(0.0954) 
0.307** 
(0.127) 
0.227** 
(0.0929) 
openk 0.00673** 
(0.00276) 
0.00682** 
(0.00296) 
0.00606** 
(0.00270) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.628 0.582 0.627 
adj. R-sq 0.607 0.557 0.605 
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Data Definitions and Sources 
 
control Percentage of respondents who chose a score of 7-10 in response to the 
question “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect 
on what happens to them. Please use this scale were 1 means ‘none at all’ 
and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” Source: 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
trust Percentage of respondents who answer that “Most people can be trusted” to 
the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” (other 
possible answers are “Can’t be too careful” and “Don’t know”). Source: 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
respect Percentage of respondents that mention “Tolerance and respect for other 
people” when asked the following question: “Here is a list of child qualities 
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.” Possible 
answers are: “Independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, 
imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, thrift, saving money and 
things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, 
obedience.” Source: www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
obedience Percentage of respondents that mention “Obedience” when asked the 
following question: “Here is a list of child qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five.” Possible answers are: “Independence, 
hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for 
other people, thrift, saving money and things, determination and 
perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience.” Source: 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
inform4  Sum of trust, respect, and control minus obedience 
xconst Extent of institutionalized constraints on the executive. The variable ranges 
from a score of (1) “Unlimited authority” to (7) “Executive parity or 
subordination”. Source: Jaggers, Keith & Marshall (2005); 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.  
malfal94 Proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of malaria 
transmission multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of malaria cases 
that involve Plasmodium Falciparum. Source: Sachs (2003); 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040.  
openk Exports plus imports divided by rgdpl. Source: Heston, Summers & Aten, 
(2006); http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.  
rgdpl Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres). Source: Heston, Summers & Aten (2006); 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
me  Instrumental variable for malaria risk. Source: Sachs (2003); 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040.   
logfrankrom Natural logarithm of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share. Source: Hall 
& Jones (1999); http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/datasets.html.  
protestant Percentage of the population being Protestant. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html.  
muslim Percentage of the population being Muslim. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html. 
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catholic Percentage of the population being Catholic. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html. 
french Dummy variable for French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
english Dummy variable for English legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
pop100km Share of the national population living within 100km of the coast. Source: 
Sachs (2003); http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040. 
latitude Latitude in absolute degrees. Source: Parker (1997); 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm. 
coastline Coastline length in kilometres. Source: Parker (1997); 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm. 
landlocked Dummy variable for landlocked. Source: Parker (1997); 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm. 
 
 
 
